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Abstract 
The purpose of the paper is to determine the most influential political advisors in the formulation of foreign and military policy 
leading up to the Second Gulf War. Using declassified and historical documents, this paper examines the influential role of 
those neo-conservatives and war lobbyists who strongly influenced George W. Bush in the planning, strategizing, and later 
launching of “Operation Iraqi Freedom.” The paper highlights the author’s perspective on the Second Persian Gulf War. It is 
based on the research conducted through analysis and discussion of existing political documents and various standpoint theo-
ries of some historians. The objective is to create a vivid picture of the US Government Plans towards Iraq and the involvement 
of war lobbyists and major decision-makers in this process during the Presidency of George W. Bush. The sole aim of the 
article is to describe and analyze US Foreign policy in connection with Iraq before the Second Gulf War, as the topic has not 
been explored in depth yet and is still open for discussion due to present day situation in Iraq.
Keywords: America, George W. Bush, Gulf War, national security, Neoconservatives, Iraq.  
Introduction
Key White House policy-makers will be identified based on 
the documents, media coverage, and existing literature. 
Why the United States decided to invade Iraq and what the 
motivation was behind this decision will be answered from 
the author’s perspective. Declassified sources and histori-
cal documents will support the author’s claim that the most 
influential policy advisors surrounding President Bush were 
Neoconservatives. Neoconservatives were individuals who 
strongly influenced George W. Bush in the planning, strate-
gizing, and later launching of the Second Persian War. Their 
goal – defeating Saddam Hussein and his tyranny and bring-
ing hegemony to the USA – was conducted under the um-
brella of “exporting democracy”.  
As one of the leading scholars states, “to understand 
what happened we need to deeply and critically enter into 
the hopes and fears of those who took the country into the 
war” (Jervis, 2011, p. 44). Hence, the close emanation of 
neo-conservative philosophy and individual personalities 
linked with neo-conservatism will be examined. 
Twelve years after the US invasion of Iraq, huge num-
bers of declassified documents can be found in the National 
Security Archive of The George Washington University 
(NSAGW). CIA briefings and reports, everyday Memos of the 
officials, confidential correspondence, FBI interrogation and 
study group reports have finally been made public. These 
documents have not been examined thoroughly by field 
researchers and were kept declassified until just recently. 
Almost all of these documents were previously classified as 
Top Secret or Secret. Consequently, the sources examined 
in our work will shed light on the motivation and influence of 
Neo-conservative philosophy and Second Persian Gulf War.
 Methods   
A complex study based on historical method was conducted. 
Data were obtained mainly from numerous internet sources 
of declassified documents and libraries, on-line articles, 
journals and hard copy books. All sources were analyzed ac-
cording to the appropriate procedures established in histori-
cal methodology. Information was processed synthetically. 
This enabled the researchers to examine and understand 
the research topic correctly. 
Results
The purpose of the paper is to determine the most influential 
political advisors in the formulation of foreign and military 
policy leading up to the Second Gulf War. Research and his-
torical documents strongly indicate leading Neoconserva-
tives Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Perle, and Richard Cheney in 
cooperation with Donald Rumsfeld and Condoleezza Rice 
were responsible for promoting American military power in 
the Middle East. 
Part One: War Lobbyists  
Iraq always held a point of interest in George W. Bush’s 
politics. During his presidential campaign he stated that 
“Building durable peace will require strong alliances … It 
will require firmness with regimes like North Korea and Iraq 
– regimes that hate our values and resent our success. I 
will address all these priorities in the future” (The Citadel, 
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1999). Bush continues by claiming that if it is discovered 
that Saddam Hussein continues working on his weapons of 
mass destruction (WMD), he would “take him out” (Yildiz, 
2004, p.90). During the campaign in 2000, Condoleezza 
Rice described Bush‘s foreign policy towards Iraq as a clear 
case of deterrence stating, “if they [Iraqis] do acquire WMD, 
their weapons will be unusable because any attempt to use 
them will bring national obliteration” (Rice, 2000). As she 
was talking about the isolation of Iraq, she mentioned that 
there was no place for Saddam in modern politics and re-
moving his regime was still a matter of discussion. “Nothing 
will change until Saddam is gone, so the United States must 
mobilize whatever resources it can, including support from 
his opposition, to remove him” (Rice, 2000).
One week earlier before inauguration George W. Bush 
met with George Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence, and 
James Pavitt, Deputy Director for Operations of CIA. The 
meeting was attended by Richard Cheney and Condoleezza 
Rice. Tenet declared that U.S. Government was facing three 
serious dangers. One of them was Al-Qaeda which posed 
immediate and huge threat. The other two were spread of 
Weapons of Mass Destruction and growing power of China 
(Daalder &Lindsay, 2003, p. 75). This was a good oppor-
tunity for Bush to clarify three main directions of National 
Security (Woodward, 2002). For him the second aspect of 
Tenets perspective was connected to Iraq and Saddam Hus-
sein directly. 
Later Bush had a meeting with the former president Bill 
Clinton, who made it clear that based on Bush’s campaign 
he concluded the following: the main headache for a new 
President was National Missile Defense and Iraq. Clinton 
also gave advice to concentrate more on Al-Qaeda, Middle 
East Diplomacy, North Korea, nuclear race in South Asia 
and only then Iraq. On February 6, 2001, Bush announced 
that USA will resume funding opposition in Iraq for the first 
time since the Iraqi army assailed opposition bases in 1996 
(Gordon & Trainor, 2007, p. 15).  
Soon Condoleezza Rice prepared proposal on “freeing 
the Iraqi people” where she reviewed dangers coming from 
Iraq and ways to overcome them. First of all, she suggested 
extending immediate military assistance to Iraqi opposition, 
based on authority that remained untapped in the Iraq Lib-
eration Act of 1998. The next step would be arming the op-
positionists so they could eventually undertake operations 
and weaken his authority. The last option would be direct 
action taken by American forces against the Iraqi regime 
(Feith, 2008, p. 206). 
Condoleezza Rice was not the only one with an action 
plan. U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz pro-
posed a strategy against Iraq which did not advocate for the 
intervention of American Military Forces. He outlined a few 
strategic goals for consideration: 
• “Win cooperation from other countries, building on the 
sixteen UN Security Council resolutions on Iraq since the 
Gulf War. 
• Strengthen the Iraqi democratic opposition, improving 
their military capabilities through U.S. training.
• Help the opposition economically by, among other 
means, excluding from the UN’s sanctions those areas in 
Iraq (in the Kurdish north) not under Saddam’s control” ( 
Feith, 2008, p. 204) 
As later Feith mentions it in The Wall Street Journal, 
Wolfowitz asked if the U.S. might create an autonomous 
area in southern Iraq similar to the autonomous Kurdish re-
gion in the north, with the goal of making Saddam little more 
than the “mayor of Baghdad.” U.S. officials also discussed 
whether a popular uprising in Iraq should be encouraged, 
and how they could best work with free Iraqi groups that op-
posed the Saddam’s regime (Feith, 2008). 
On June 1, 2001 National Security adviser, Condoleez-
za Rice, chaired a meeting of Principals Committee. After 
much discussion four main directions were put on the table: 
continuing current containment strategy, actively supporting 
Saddam’s opponents, creating a better environment for in-
surgents in southern Iraq, and planning a U.S. invasion. But 
no final policy was set and administration officials continued 
to pursue their separate agendas (Gordon & Trainor, 2007, 
p.16). 
Paul O’Neill, U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, mentions 
that in January 2001, during the first meeting of National Se-
curity Council, the White House considered the Iraqi threat 
and the possibility of the removal of Saddam (Packer, 2005, 
p. 39). This indicates that Iraq was always considered a na-
tional threat. But even so, at this point it does not suggest 
that Bush administration was mentally ready for removing 
the Baath regime.   
In February 2001, Secretary of State Colin Powell 
launched his Middle East tour to address the Iraqi problem. 
His main goal was to develop new sanctions.  As Douglas 
Feith will indicate in his article later “In the months before 
the 9/11 attack, Secretary of State Colin Powell advocated 
diluting the multinational economic sanctions, in the hope 
that a weaker set of sanctions could win stronger and more 
sustained international support” (Feith, 2008). At this stage 
main goals for the US government were containment pol-
icy towards Iraq, isolation of Saddam, and ensuring secu-
rity for the neighboring countries. Also they had to control 
Saddam’s regime so United Nation sanctions would not be 
violated and the Iraqi government would not create a threat 
of WMD for the whole region. On the other hand, oil flow on 
international market had to remain unhindered. 
It has to be mentioned that United States was already 
irritated, because they could not use UN resolutions in their 
favour. In a memo of 27 July  to Condoleezza Rice, Secre-
tary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld states that they could pub-
licly acknowledge that sanctions did not work over extended 
periods and stop pretending to have a policy that was keep-
ing Saddam “in the box,” when he had actually “crawled a 
good distance out of the box” (Plett, 2001). Rumsfeld is rec-
ommending Principal Committee meeting on Iraq, to be fol-
lowed by a National Security Council meeting. In the Same 
memo he concludes “Sanctions are being limited in a way 
that cannot weaken Saddam Hussein. He undid the UN in-
spections in the 1990s and is working now to further undo 
the sanctions and the no-fly zones. He appears to believe he 
is getting stronger. His general behavior and relationships 
with his neighbors suggest he is riding higher than a year 
ago” (Rumsfeld, 2001). 
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Meanwhile, U.N. took the resolution No. 1352 to con-
tinue Oil for Food program for 30 days. All this was directed 
to allow possible revision of the sanctions. By default this 
was a signal that the reform of decade-old sanctions on Iraq 
might be under consideration (BBC News, 2001). U.K. of-
ficials were making statements that “it is very unlikely that 
London and Washington will give President Saddam Hus-
sein control of his oil revenues again” (Mason, 2001). But 
the new resolution policy was a failure because of the lack 
of support from Russia, China, and France. After 30 days 
Security Council extended the period twice, for 5 and then 
for 6 months (UN Office of the Iraq Program, 2010). 
George W. Bush administration’s entered the White 
House with the philosophy to remove Saddam Hussein’s 
regime. But the pre-war accusations that Iraq possessed 
Weapons of Mass Destruction were not confirmed even af-
ter the end of the war. In 2008 George W. Bush spoke about 
the biggest regret during his presidency: “I don’t know – the 
biggest regret of all the presidency has to have been the in-
telligence failure in Iraq. A lot of people put their reputations 
on the line and said the Weapons of Mass Destruction is a 
reason to remove Saddam Hussein. It wasn’t just people in 
my administration. A lot of members in Congress, prior to my 
arrival in Washington DC, during the debate on Iraq, a lot of 
leaders of nations around the world were all looking at the 
same intelligence. And, you know, that’s not a do-over, but 
I wish the intelligence had been different.” (Spilius, 2008). 
After a couple of weeks of long fighting and the suc-
cessive capture of Baghdad, the luck of the American mili-
tary campaign evaporated. Not enough American soldiers 
were mobilized – thanks to Rumsfeld – and soon marauders 
robbed the main governmental buildings, priceless exhib-
its were left without protection and eventually stolen from 
the Iraqi National Museum, and Iraq was thrust into chaos. 
(Rumsfeld, 2011). 
Another mistake was to demobilize the Iraqi Army. As a 
result militaries mixed with the civilians and created an ad-
ditional danger. Iraqis indeed witnessed the fall of Saddam’s 
tyranny, but the USA could not establish any kind of Gov-
ernmental system. For some time there was even outage of 
electricity and water. Americans became targets for experi-
enced rebels. 
In this chaos fundamental Islamist leaders entered the 
country. They were the founders and pioneers of the terror-
ist movements. A member of Al Qaeda’s inner council and 
strategist Mustafa Setmariam Nasar, under the pen-name 
Al Suri asserts that: “The American occupation of Iraq, he 
declares, inaugurated a “historical new period” that almost 
single-handedly rescued the jihadi movement just when 
many of its critics thought it was finished.”  (Wright, 2006). 
Iraq was covered by the waves of bombing. In 2006, Richard 
Norton, Member of Iraqi Study Group says “Surveying U.S. 
history, one is hard-pressed to find presidential decisions as 
monumentally ill-informed and counterproductive as the de-
cision to invade and occupy Iraq” (Silverstein, 2007). 
Part Two: Neoconservatives       
To understand the foreign policy of the Bush administration 
we have to analyze policymakers who were active during his 
presidency. Until 1990 the term Neo-conservative was never 
used to describe a certain group of people or philosophy of 
international politics. Known as “Reagan Democrats,” their 
ideology suggested protecting national security by spread-
ing and exporting freedom and democracy globally by as-
sisting pro-democratic parties, consolidating international 
aid and in many cases by military intervention. As John 
Dumbrell explained Neoconservatism preaches the theory 
of democratic peace, which is possible only by internal de-
mocracy (Dumbrell, 2008, p. 31).
The conclusion that main decision makers of the war 
were Neocons has its followers among scholars, journalists 
or historians (Packer, 2005. Ricks, 2006; Ferguson, 2008; 
Mearsheimer & Walt, 2007). Since 1990, Paul Wolfowitz, 
Richard Perle, and Eliot Abrams were on the side of anti-
Hussein policy. Finally during the presidency of George W. 
Bush several steps were taken by the White House adminis-
tration, which were favourable for Neocons.  
From the beginning they fully supported George W. 
Bush. Two well-known members of the Neoconservative 
group, Richard Perle and Paul Wolfowitz were his political 
advisors during the presidential campaign (National Secu-
rity Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 326). The Secre-
tary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld also appeared among the 
followers of anti-Iraqi ideology. At some point there was a 
belief that Colin Powell, who had a very good military back-
ground and knew the region very well, could balance anti-
Iraqi wave. Nevertheless, taking into consideration the po-
litical environment in which he found himself he decided to 
change his side and support the regime change in Iraq. This 
would appear to be supported by the fact that three main 
political positions in new administration went to Neocons – 
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Deputy Secretary of 
Defense Paul Wolfowitz and Douglas J. Feith, who served 
as Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Nevertheless, 
they had strong support from both Vice President Richard 
Cheney and Condoleezza Rice, strengthening the argument 
that Neocons were leading the decision-making process 
concerning Iraqi policy.       
The anti-Iraqi group was so powerful that they tried to tie 
Iraq with any kind of danger to the USA. One of the prime ar-
guments and example for this point might be the meeting of 
agencies (FBI, CIA etc.) on terrorism, where Richard Clarke 
put on the table the threat coming from Al-Qaeda. Wolfow-
itz directs the subject to Iraq. Bob Woodward gives tenable 
analysis when he writes that for the August of 2001 aim of 
Neocons towards Iraq can be explained as “Enclave Strat-
egy.” As Wolfowitz suggested enclave would support Iraqi 
opposition and finally would collapse Hussein’s tyranny. Col-
in Powell assumed that 25 million Iraqis would immediately 
join American-supported opposition. For Wolfowitz this was 
the most absurd, strategically unbelievable suggestion. His 
tentative proposal for President was not to rush or allow any-
one manipulate him until he had a solid reason (Woodward, 
2004). 
It is important to mention that after 9/11 Neoconserva-
tives were giving interviews where they were underlining 
changes that the terrorist attack brought. For the sake of an 
argument, we have to note how proudly they stated that they 
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had influence to share their own ideas with the leaders. The 
consensus among scientists about the opened possibilities 
for selling Neocon ideas to Georg W. Bush, Donald Rums-
feld and Richard Cheney after 9/11 can be seen as logical 
continuation of above mentioned interviews.  
After terrorist attack on World Trade Center, Richard 
Perle had a conversation with David Frum, speechwriter 
of Bush. He said that: “we are not going to deal effectively 
with global terrorism if states can support and sponsor and 
harbor terrorists without penalty” (Perle, Interview, 2003). 
In September 19, 2001 Perle was leading Defense Policy 
Counsel, which mainly discussed Iraqi issue (Gordon & 
Trainor, p. 15). Ian Shapiro claims that after 9/11 to discuss 
terrorism as subject matter of Criminal Law was widely used 
by Neocons for their long term plans (Shapiro, 2007, p. 120). 
Iraq was always discussed in the White House, but all 
these plans and strategic proposals ripened into an action 
plan just after 9/11 terrorist attack.  For Neocons this was a 
chance to actively advocate and realize their ideas. Robert 
Kagan and William Kristol are making a strong statement in 
The Weekly Standard while stating: “It is past time for the 
United States to step up and accept the real responsibilities 
and requirements of global leadership. We’ve already tried 
the alternative. … It is a tough and dangerous decision to 
send American soldiers to fight and possibly die in Iraq. But 
it is more horrible to watch men and women leap to their 
deaths from flaming skyscrapers. If we fail to address the 
grave threats we know exist, what will we tell the families of 
future victims? That we were “prudent”?” (Kagan & Kristol, 
2002).  
To explain reasons of the war two researchers John 
Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt are studying the influence 
of Neo-conservatism followers. In their book “The Israel 
Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy” they are openly stating that 
Neocons were supporting Israel and were trying to convince 
leaders, that the September 11 terrorist attack demanded 
immediate action. Destroying Saddam’s tyranny should be-
come a part of the bigger plan to remove all threats coming 
from Iraq.  Spreading democracy in the region was a priority. 
In their opinion this plan was put on the table after events of 
September 2001. But Mearsheimer and Walt are do not take 
account of the fact that the plan to remove Hussein and start 
fighting for regional dominancy was created long before Al-
Qaeda attacks (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2007). 
To strengthen the argument we will try to bring exam-
ples from Clinton’s administration. Operation Dessert Strike 
in 1996 is clear indication of anti-Iraqi attitude. (Koppel, 
1996). This was favourable for both hawkish Democrats and 
Republicans as in both camps there were politicians who 
desired US supremacy in the Middle East through conflict. 
Especially Neoconservatives benefitted from it. Their main 
goal became the regime change in Iraq by all means. Their 
priority was the “export of democracy” (Davis, 2006, p. 30). 
Supporting local opposition was the part of their strategy. 
They also have found a desirable candidate – Ahmed Chal-
abi, an expatriate from Iraq. He was very close to Paul Wol-
fowitz and Richard Perle. (Dizard, 2004).
Long before Neocons found Chalabi, the CIA was inter-
ested in him. In the early 1990s, the CIA was already funding 
the opposition in Iraq and The Iraqi National Congress (INC) 
was created in 1992. Ahmed Chalabi became the head of the 
Congress. Of course people in Agency knew how to avoid 
direct connections with friends of America so money for INC 
went from Rendon Group. There is some evidence to sug-
gest that this company was conducting international political 
works for Defense Department as well (Dizard, 2004). 
INC was receiving military aid from Kurds. It is maybe 
possible that this INC should be a platform for establishing 
democracy in Iraq. In 1993 Chalabi started the realization 
of the action plan to change Iraqi government. Based on 
his scenario INC had a leading role in organizing an upris-
ing  in the South part of Iraq through Shias, whereas Kurds 
would start rebellion in the north.  One of the most obvious 
goals that Chalabi was trying to achieve was bringing INC to 
power. The plan was coordinated with the U.S.A. In his team 
Chalabi had figures like – General Wayne Downing and for-
mer officer of CIA Duane “Dewey” Clarridge. They became 
military instructors of INC volunteers. As for General Down-
ing, he by himself was working on the action plan. 
On the basis of evidence currently available, it seems 
fair to suggest that Ahmed Chalabi’s END GAME failed in 
1995. The plan was based on tentative proposal that Iraq 
was ready for uprising and no military unit would fight on 
Saddam Hussein’s side. A serious counterargument to the 
consideration is that the same military forces were fighting 
with Hussein during previous revolt of Shias and Kurds. This 
raises a question as to why the creator of the plan consid-
ered that Iraqi Soldiers would stay inactive. One of the prime 
failing of “revolutionary movements” that started in 1995 was 
the above-mentioned opinion. Iraqi forces started fighting 
with Saddam and they indeed killed around 100 followers of 
INC. The Central Intelligence Agency stopped funding INC, 
which served as umbrella for Iraqi opposition groups. INC 
was dissolved. Chalabi and couple of his followers escaped 
to London (Lang, 2004). 
The culmination might be considered the year of 1998 
and Bill Clinton’s “Iraqi Liberation Act.”  To put it differently, 
with this document Neoconservatives justified their ideol-
ogy. During his statement of October 31, 1998 “The United 
States looks forward to a democratically supported regime 
that would permit us to enter into a dialogue leading to the 
reintegration of Iraq into normal international life… United 
States continues to look to the Security Council’s efforts to 
keep the current regime’s behavior in check; we look for-
ward to new leadership in Iraq that has the support of the 
Iraqi people. The United States is providing support to op-
position groups from all sectors of the Iraqi community that 
could lead to a popularly supported government” (NSA Elec-
tronic Briefing Book 326 – Statement by President).
This point is particularly relevant while discussing Neo-
conservative philosophy.  Every word that Clinton mentioned 
in the statement can be related to their ideology. For the 
sake of an argument we have to mention the obvious fact – 
somehow Clinton administration managed to draw the same 
policy as Neoconservatives. On May 1, 1998 President Clin-
ton signed Public Law 105 – 174, which made $5,000,000 
available for assistance of the Iraqi democratic opposition 
for such activities as organization, training, communication, 
and dissemination of information; developing and imple-
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menting agreements among opposition groups; compiling 
information to support the indictment of Iraqi officials for the 
war crimes, and for related purposes. The president should 
provide Iraqi democratic opposition with the following assis-
tances: 1. Broadcasting Assistance – the U.S. Information 
Agency had a budget of $2,000,000 for fiscal year 1999 to 
carry out these goals; 2. Military Assistance – The aggregate 
value of assistance provided may not exceed $97,000,000; 
3. Humanitarian Assistance. But there was a restriction – no 
organization with a connection to Saddam Hussein or his 
regime would get any aid from the U.S.A. (NSA Electronic 
Briefing Book 326). 
The Iraqi Liberation Act of 1998 appeared to be a vic-
tory for the Neocons but next steps of Clinton Administration 
were quite disappointing for them. The government failed to 
take any further effective moves to achieve the goals.  
This changed during the George W. Bush Administra-
tion when Neocons convinced Richard Cheney about the 
threats and dangers Iraq could create. Cheney subsequent-
ly convinced Bush that Hussain had to go (Mearsheimer & 
Walt, 2007, p. 247). Initially it may seem that Bush needed 
convincing but on the contrary, all he wanted was good rea-
son and motive. It is widely accepted that he had personal 
interest towards Iraq. He even had his own vision and while 
we were researching the causes of the war within his ad-
ministration we must not forget Bush family interests in Iraq. 
Hussein practically became personal enemy for Bush family 
and removing his regime was unfinished business. 
There still is a lot to learn about the “complete story” of 
Richard Cheney. Nevertheless, based on journalistic facts 
about meetings of Cheney and one of the leading Neocon – 
Bernard Lewis, one can assume that Cheney was “convert-
ed”. After those exact meetings he stood on the side of war 
for the sake of “exporting democracy.”  Even more, he was 
protecting the idea of spreading democracy and during his 
speeches he leaned on words such as – peace and freedom 
in the Middle East. This would appear to be supported by his 
statement of August 2002: “When the gravest of threats are 
eliminated the freedom loving peoples of the region will have 
a chance to promote the values that can bring lasting peace” 
(Mearsheimer & Walt, 2007, p.255).  
While it may well be valid that Cheney was “converted”, 
it contradicts the fact that Richard Cheney had the back-
ground and history of working during Nixon, Ford, George 
H. W. Bush, and George W. Bush Administrations and it’s 
highly doubtable that he became a target for converting.  He 
knew all the people involved in the process. It is also argu-
able that he adopted the plan of “exporting democracy.” It 
is a clear fact that he was more lobbing for oil rather than 
democracy (Cheney, 1999). Cheney had his own history 
with oil. From 1995 until 2000 he was CEO of Halliburton. 
(Ricks, 2006, p.18). This is a company which provides wide 
range of services including products and services to the oil 
and gas industry. In 1998 Cheney said during the Panhandle 
Producers and Royalty Owners Association annual meeting: 
“You’ve got to go where the oil is. I don’t think about it [politi-
cal volatility] very much.” (Bruno & Valette, 2001). Therefore 
“conversion” of Cheney is highly doubtable. His and Neo-
conservatives interests’ had a lot of similarities. 
Nevertheless, mentioning Cheney and oil brings us to 
the reason, which is believed to be the most substantial for 
why the USA started the conflict. While stating about mo-
tives we have to mention one curious case - the name of 
the entire operation. In the beginning indicated name was 
Operation Iraqi Liberation (Press Briefing by Ari Fleischer, 
March 24, 2004). Soon after the start of the war the name 
was modified and it became Operation Iraqi Freedom. Obvi-
ously the abbreviation of the Operation Iraqi Liberation (OIL) 
showed the most, if not the only, important motives for the 
war.  The pursuit of oil combined with the US regional inter-
ests, George W. Bush’s personal motives, and Neoconserv-
ative ideology must be taken into consideration when reach-
ing a conclusion. The most comprehensive mistake that was 
made by Americans was leaving Iraq a without local leader 
who could control the whole country. 
Conclusion 
The purpose of the paper is to determine the most influential 
political advisors in the formulation of foreign and military 
policy in the Bush administration leading up to the Second 
Gulf War. Key White House policy-makers are identified 
based on documents, media coverage, and existing litera-
ture. Declassified sources and historical documents support 
the argument that the most influential policy advisors sur-
rounding George W. Bush were leading Neoconservatives. 
Additionally, as stated above, the pursuit of oil combined 
with the US regional interests, George W. Bush’s personal 
motives, and Neoconservative ideology must be taken into 
consideration when understanding American post 9/11 for-
eign policy. However, the authors would like to stress that if 
not for the 2001 terrorist attacks and the tremendous intel-
lectual intervention of Neoconservatives, it is highly unlikely 
that the Bush administration would have started the war in 
the Middle East.
Although some researchers like Max Boot and Jane J. 
Kirkpatrick  suggest that “the administration has adopted 
these policies not because of the impact of the neocons 
but because of the impact of the four airplanes hijacked on 
September 11, 2001. Following the worst terrorist attack in 
U.S. history, Bush realized the United States no longer could 
afford a “humble” foreign policy. The ambitious National Se-
curity Strategy that the administration issued in September 
2002-with its call for U.S. primacy, the promotion of democ-
racy, and vigorous action, preemptive if necessary, to stop 
terrorism and weapons proliferation-was a quintessentially 
neoconservative document.”  We believe that the influence 
and power of the Neocons prevented Bush from entertain-
ing a more multilateral and diplomatic post 9/11 foreign pol-
icy (Boot & Kirkpatrick, 2004). As such, the United States 
instead played a role of the hegemon. As Robert Kagan 
strongly concludes America wanted to restore international 
order and secure her place as the world leader. 
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